- Executive officers
- Right to sue
- Schedule 1 employer
The issue in this application was whether the plaintiff's right of action was taken away by section 31 of the WSIA and whether the plaintiff was entitled to claim benefits under the WSIA. The issue to be decided was whether the defendant company was a Schedule 1 employer at the time of the accident on November 13, 2014. This issue turned on whether the defendant company's business activities fell within a Schedule 1 industry and whether the defendant company employed at least one "worker," as defined in the WSIA, at the time of the November 2014 accident.
The Vice-Chair granted the application. Accordingly, the plaintiff's right of action against the defendants was taken away and he was entitled to claim benefits under the WSIA for his injuries. The Vice-Chair found that the defendant's spouse was appropriately considered to be a worker and not an executive officer of the defendant company at the time of the November 2014 workplace accident. It was therefore unnecessary to consider whether the other seasonal employee was a worker. Although the defendant's spouse was a 50% shareholder of the defendant company, this does not in itself signify that she was an executive officer of the business (see Decision No. 1959/14). Rather, it is the substance of the relationship that determines whether an individual is considered an executive officer. On this basis, the Vice-Chair could not find that she was a directing mind of the corporation such that she was an executive officer of the company despite a lack of formal appointment (see Decision No. 538/06). Her role in the business was essentially limited to an administrative function. The defendant's spouse delegated her authority entirely to a single director, namely the defendant, who then appointed himself as sole officer of the corporation (i.e., President and Secretary). The Vice-Chair found that only the defendant exercised a broad scope of authority to make decisions for the business as a whole and to act independently on behalf of the defendant company. He was solely responsible for the overall direction and control of the company's operations and financial affairs, and had the ability to bind the corporation. The Vice-Chair did not agree that the defendant's spouse could be considered a partner of the business. The defendant company was incorporated and was, at law, a corporation. A partnership is a different legal entity that is not separate from its partners. The Vice-Chair could not apply the benefit of the doubt provision as it only applies to a person claiming benefits under the WSIA. It therefore does not apply to right to sue applications.Since the defendant company's business activities were compulsorily covered in Schedule 1, the defendant company was considered to fall under this Schedule regardless of whether it was registered with the WSIB at the time of the accident (see Decision No. 334/07). Consequently, the defendant, as an executive officer, would have had the benefit of the protections of the WSIA because, at the time the accident occurred, he was engaged in activity related to the defendant company (i.e., driving the vehicle allegedly involved in the November 13, 2014 accident).